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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Perhaps the day is not too distant when, certainly, in consider-
ing the doctrine of attractive nuisances, New" York will join the ranks
of those progressive states which subordinate the protection of prop-
erty interests to personal interests, where serious bodily harm ensues.
It is true that with the humane side of the matter the law cannot be
concerned, but, in view of transmuted concepts as a result of societal
evolution, the law may validly create a legal duty where it otherwise
did not exist. Only in this way can the complete body of the Law
of Torts, in New York, become "a living manifestation of the insti-
tutions of a changing political and economic culture."
HAROLD E. COLLINS.
RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND EXPLODING BOTTLES
The rule of res ipsa loquitur 1 has been a source of confusion in
many of our modern courts, causing many and diverse definitions of
its meaning and purpose.2 As a result we find that different juris-
dictions vary widely in their application of the rule, although it would
be safe to say that the rule is now applied in one form or another in
every state of the Union. There was a time, though, when the rule
was not looked upon quite so favorably and the courts were reluctant
to apply it.3
Perhaps the best and most oft-quoted definition of the rule was
that offered by Chief Justice Erle in 1865: 4 "There must be rea-
sonable evidence of negligence; but where the thing is shown to be
under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the ac-
cident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords reason-
able evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that
the accident was from want of care." Thus, when -an accident occurs
under the foregoing rule, an inference, 5 and in some jurisdictions a
1 Literally, "the thing itself speaks."
2 "It adds nothing to the law, has no meaning which is not more clearly
expressed for us in English, and brings confusion to our legal discussions."
Bond, C.J., dissenting in Potomac Edison Co. v. Johnson, 160 Md. 33, 152 Atl.
633 (1930).
3 "If that phrase had not been in Latin, nobody would have called it a
principle." Lord Shaw in Ballard v. North British R. Co., Sess. Cas., H. L.
43 (1923).
4 Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 596, 159 Eng.
Rep. 665 (Ex. 1865).
5 Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. R., 329 U. S. 452, 91 L. ed. 355(1947); Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. R., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504
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presumption," arises as to the defendant's negligence. It is considered
that the fact of the occurrence of the injury, when viewed in light
of the surrounding circumstances permits an inference of culpability
on the part of the defendant, makes out a prima facie case for the
plaintiff, and presents a question of fact that the defendant must come
forward to answer.7
The rule of res ipsa loquitur is based on probabilities arising out
of common experience and the peculiar circumstances of the particular
occurrence; 8 it arises from the inherent nature and character of the
act causing the injury and from probability as to its cause that may
be reasonably inferred from the circumstances of the accident itself.
Hence the rule will not apply where direct evidence establishes facts
relating to the cause of the injury itself.9 In those cases to which
the rule of res ipsa loquitur is applicable it is necessary to distinguish
between the rule itself and circumstantial evidence. In the former
case there is no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, of sufficient
probative value to show negligence, apart from the postulate that
from common experience we know that a certain type of accident does
not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence.10 Circumstantial
evidence points to a specific act of negligence, but in applying the
rule of res ipsa loquitur we point to no particular failing on the part
of the defendant, but merely allege and prove an accident from the
happening of which negligence may be inferred. 1 But even should
the rule be rejected by the court as not applicable in a particular
case, the plaintiff is not precluded from proceeding with his case and
proving negligence on the part of the defendant by either circum-
stantial or direct evidence.
The rule of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of procedural, not sub-
stantive law.' 2 As a rule of evidence it is applied only when evi-
(1922); Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 57 L. ed. 815 (1913); Griffen v.
Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901).8 Pjecke v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n, 206 Mo. App. 246, 227 S. W.
631 (1921); Fitch v. Mason City & C. L. Traction Co., 124 Iowa 665, 100
N. W. 618 (1904).7 Johnson v. Herring, 89 Mont 420, 300 Pac. 535 (1931) ; Plumb v. Rich-
mond Light & R. R., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504 (1922); Sand Springs
Park v. Schrader, 82 Okla. 244, 198 Pac. 983 (1921).8 Hart v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., 233 Mo. App. 312, 118
S. W. 2d 509 (1938); Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. R., 233 N. Y. 285,
f35 N. E. 504 (1922); see Kapros v. Pierce Oil Corporation, 324 Mo. 992,
25 S. W. 2d 777 (1930).
9 Feiderlein v. Faiella, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 114 (Sup. Ct 1945) ; Gray v. Balti-
more & Ohio R. R., 24 F. 2d 671 (C. C. A. 7th 1928); Heffter v. Northern
States Power Co., 173 Minn. 215, 217 N. W. 102 (1927); O'Rourke v. Mar-
shall Field & Co., 307 Ill. 197, 138 N. E. 625 (1923).10 Kapros v. Pierce Oil Corporation, 324 Mo. 992, 25 S. W. 2d 777 (1930);
Judson v. Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 40 Pac. 1020 (1895).
11 Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N. Y. 108, 38 N. E. 2d 455 (1941);
Robinson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 194 N. Y. 37, 86 N. E. 805 (1909).12 American Dist. Electric P. Co. v. Seaboard Air L. Ry., 129 Fla. 518,
177 So. 294 (1937); Stewart v. Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 50 Ariz. 60,
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dence is lacking, yet, in itself it does not constitute evidence.'3 It is
a rule which permits, but does not compel, a jury to infer negligence;
it still remains for the jury to weigh the circumstances peculiar to the
occurrence and to say whether or not the defendant was negligent.14
It permits the jury to weigh the inference against the evidence offered
by the defendant in rebuttal thereof.
As a general rule the courts have insisted upon the presence of
two circumstances to justify the application of the rule of res ipsa
loquitur: (1) proof that the instrumentality causing the injury to the
plaintiff was in the exclusive possession and control of the defendant
and that the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence, and,
(2) that the injury was such as in view of the surrounding circum-
stances would not have happened without legal wrong by the
defendant. 15
Exclusive Control by the Defendant
What bearing does exclusive possession and control of the in-
strumentality causing the injury have upon the issue when there is
involved therein an exploding bottle or other sealed container no
longer in the hands of the manufacturer of the bottle or container,
or the bottler of its contents? Exclusive possession and control of
the instrumentality causing the injury are made part of the rule of
res ipsa loquitur because the law attempts to hold the defendant liable
when, through his negligent operation of the instrumentality, some
person is injured. He, the defendant, by exercising exclusive pos-
session and control of the instrumentality causing the injury is in a
position best able to explain the occurrence of the accident. 16 In the
case of Curley v. Ruppert,17 recently decided in New York, the court
held that the rule of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable where the
defendant had delivered the bottle to the retailer three days prior to
the explosion of the bottle which injured an employee of the retailer
even though the bottle underwent no change while in the possession
of the plaintiff. The bottle, in fact, was handled as would normally
be expected, i.e., it was stored in the rear of the store until the re-
68 P. 2d 952 (1937) ; Sawyer v. People's Freight Lines, 42 Ariz. 145, 22 P. 2d
1080 (1933); Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. R., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E.
504 (1922) ; Griffen v. Manice, 166 N,. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901).
13 Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. R., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504(1922).
14 Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. R., 329 U. S. 452, 91 L. ed. 355(1947); Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. R., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504
(1922) ; Ridge v. Norfolk Southern R. R., 167 N. C. 510, 83 S. E. 762 (1914) ;
Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 57 L. ed. 815 (1913) ; Griffen v. Manice, 166
N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901).
25 Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 57 L. ed. 815 (1913) ; San Juan Light
Co. v. Requena, 224 U. S. 89, 56 L. ed. 680 (1912).
is Penson v. Inland Empire Paper Co., 73 Wash. 338, 132 Pac. 39 (1913).
'7 272 App. Div. 441, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 578 (1st Dep't 1947).
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tailer was ready to replenish his stock.- The court refused to extend
the rule of res ipsa loquitur to include those cases wherein the de-
fendant was not in control of the instrumentality causing the injury
at the time the injury occurred. Just what bearing the fact of ex-
clusive possession and control at the time of the injury had upon
these particular circumstances is hard to divine. Surely, if the bottle
had remained in the possession of the defendant it would not have
been treated differently. Thus we see that such a dogmatic applica-
tion of the rule deprives the rule of its very potency; the purpose of
the rule is defeated. The rule of res ipsa loquitur was originated to
give to the plaintiff an opportunity to recover when in all justice he
is apparently entitled to it, but remains at a loss to explain the oc-
currence from which his injury emanates. That particular portion
of the rule requiring that exclusive possession and control of the in-
strumentality causing the injury be in the defendant was included
in the rule in order that the defendant, since he controls the injurious
instrumentality, may be held responsible for exercising his control
negligently; or through his superior knowledge of the accident, by
reason of his having control, explain to the court why this accident
happened and wherein he is blameless; or show to the satisfaction
of the court that he took all reasonable precautions to avoid its hap-
pening. In the Curley case, this incident of possession and control
at the time of the injury is unimportant since the control exercised
would have been no different if it had been exercised by the defen-
dant. As illogical as the reasoning in the Curley case may be it seems
to be followed by a substantial number of the jurisdictions in this
country. Fortunately, however, there is a trend in the opposite di-
rection. In the case of Riecke v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n 8
there was an explosion of a bottle, which, while in the possession and
control of the defendant, injured the plaintiff. There was no need
in that case to extend the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as is advocated
herein, yet the court mentioned the case of Payne v. Rome Coca-
Cola Bottling Co.10 as adhering to this extension. Four years later
the same jurisdiction decided a case wherein the plaintiff was injured
by an exploding bottle which at the time of the injury was in the
plaintiff's possession.20 Therein the court recognized the rule of res
ipsa loquitur as promulgated in Riecke v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing
Ass'n 21 and the extension of the doctrine in the case of Payne v.
Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 22 and as a result made a similar ex-
tension of the rule in the case before it. A similar case involving
an exploding bottle was decided three years ago in Texas, wherein
the court held that the rule of res ipsa loquitur would be extended
18 206 Mo. App. 246, 227 S. W. 631 (1921).
19 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S. E. 1087 (1912).
20 Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n, 307 Mo. 520, 271 S. W. 497
(1925).
21206 Mo. App. 246, 227 S. W. 631 (1921).
22 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S. E. 1087 (1912).
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to include those cases wherein food or drink is sold in sealed con-
tainers even though the accident occurs after the defendant has de-
livered up possession and control of the container to the plaintiff. 2
Thus, there is evidence of a gradual turning away from the hard and
fast application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur and in its stead there
is appearing a common-sense evaluation and appraisal of the facts
peculiar to each case. Such a common-sense appraisal of circUm-
stances is certainly needed in those cases wherein a manufacturer has
delivered up possession and control of a sealed container of food or
drink to a consumer followed by an injury to the consumer from the
explosion of the manufacturer's product. In almost all of the cases
involving exploding bottles the possession and control of the bottle
is no longer in the manufacturer or bottler and as a result the plain-
tiff is many times preclyded from recovering a judgment unless it be
on the theory of a breach of warranty.
There is no reason, other than precedent-which at times may
be the yoke that strangles the law courts-why this logical extension
of the rule of res ipsa loquitur should not be applied in those states
that have adhered to the strict theory that if possession and control
are not in the defendant at the time of the injury then the plaintiff
may not recover upon the theory of res ipsa loquitur. Moreover,
sealed containers do not usually undergo an extraneous harmful
change between the time that they leave the manufacturer or bottler
and the time that they are placed in the hands of a consumer. Due
to their condition-their being shut off from the atmosphere by virtue
of their processing-sealed containers reach the consumer in substan-
tially the same condition as they were when they left the manufac-
turer or bottler. Thus the manufacturer's or bottler's control over
the container or bottle is still apparent by reason of the condition he
has created. Why should it- not be proper to assume that though
the manufacturer or bottler is not in immediate possession he is,
nevertheless, still in control of the product he has placed on the
market? In those cases dealing with sealed containers the manu-
facturer or bottler has control over the condition of the container
until some person exercises a different control over it, i.e., a control
prejudicial to the condition in which it was marketed. Consequently,
it becomes unreasonable and illogical to say that the rule of res ipsa
loquitur is not applicable when the manufacturer or bottler is not in
possession and control at the time of the injury because the defendant,
although he does not have possession of the instrumentality causing
the injury, he does have control over it since he was the one' who
placed it in its present condition and offered it to the consumer as.
such.
Basically, the question resolves itself into this form: Is the de-
fendant to be relieved of all liability concerning his product upon the
instant that it is delivered from his possession and control, even
2 3 Honea v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272, 183 S. W. 2d 968'(1944).
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though the instrumentality he has produced or manufactured under-
goes no change affecting its condition by those succeeding him in
possession and control? In those cases dealing with exploding bot-
tles an affirmative reply to the foregoing query would be untenable.
It is true that under our present system of law a plaintiff in such a
case would not be precluded from proving a direct act of negligence
that caused his injury; nor circumstantial evidence from which de-
fendant's liability might be adduced; nor would he be precluded from
obtaining a recovery upon the theory of a breach of warranty. But
the injured plaintiff, according to the reasoning and decision in the
Curley case, would be precluded from proceeding against the defen-
dant under the rule of res ipsa loquitur. In all practicability, unless
the plaintiff has some proof, direct or circumstantial, tending to show
wherein the defendant was negligent, he will not be permitted to re-
cover under any of the foregoing theories of negligence; he will be
defeated unless he is allowed to invoke a rule of evidence applicable
to the peculiar circumstances-the rule of res ipsa loquitur.
The rule of res ipsa loquitur should be extended to permit its
application to those cases wherein an explosion has occurred after
the bottle has left the hands of the person sought to be held liable
provided that the testimony shows the bottle was (1) not accessible
to extraneous harmful forces, and, (2) carefully handled by the plain-
tiff or any third person who may have moved or touched it.24
Defendant's Legal Wrong
The second circumstance necessary to invoke the rule of res ipsa
loquitur is that the injury must be such as in the ordinary course of
things would not have happened if the one having the control of the
instrumentality had used proper care.25 The circumstances surround-
ing the injury, must be such as to show with reasonable probability
that the particular accident would not have occurred without legal
wrong by the defendant.2 6 Perhaps the most logical explanation of
this phase of the rule of res ipsa loquitur will be found in the dis-
senting opinion by Justice Van Voorhies in Curley v. Ruppert: 27
"It seems to me that the explosion of a beer bottle, which has been
kept only for three days under usual conditions in a grocery store, is
something which would not occur, in the ordinary course of events,
if reasonable care had been employed in the bottling of it.. . . If
the bottle was defective in the instant case then . . . the defendant
was called upon to make an explanation. If the bottle was not de-
fective, the inference is strengthened that the brewery was negligent
24 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P. 2d 436
(1944).25 Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901) ; Judson v. Giant
Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 40 Pac. 1020 (1895).
26 Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N. Y. 1Q8, 38 N. E. 2d 455 (1941).
27272 App. Div. 441, 445, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 578, 582 (1st Dept 1947).
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in filling it at too high a pressure, or with beer that would develop
increased pressure to a dangerous degree after a lapse of three days
in a grocery store. In either event, plaintiff has made out a prima
fade case." There are certain occurrences which in themselves are
indicative of negligence. "All that is required is that reasonable men
shall be able to say on the whole it is more likely that there was neg-
ligence associated with the cause than that there was not. When no
such probabilities in favor of negligence can be found, res ipsa loquitur
does not apply." 28
In those cases wherein a bottle explodes and injury results to
the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is shown to be handling the bottle with
care, an inference of negligence will not be associated with the plain-
tiff. But is this also true of the manufacturer or bottler? On the
contrary it is logical to assume that where an unexplained accident
occurs, two people being in control of the instrumentality at different
times and one person shown to be without fault, the inference of neg-
ligence attaches to the one who has failed to offer an explanation or
exonerate himself. Of course the rule of res ipsa loquitur does not
apply to those cases wherein the injury occurs as a result of an act
of God, or wherein the particular defendant is shown to be devoid
of blame. Nor does it apply where the inference of culpability is
just as strong against the plaintiff as it is against the defendant.
Conclusion
The extension of the rule of res ipsa loquitur to those cases
wherein an explosion occurs after the sealed container has been de-
livered to the retailer or the consumer is a much-needed and logical
extension of the rule as may be seen from the illogical and impotent
reasoning of the majority of the court in the Curley case. "All that
is necessary is that the defendant have exclusive control of the factors
which apparently have caused the accident; and one who supplies a
chattel to another may have had sufficient control of its condition
although it has passed out of his possession." 29 Moreover, since the
rule of res ipsa loquitur is basically a common-sense appraisal of
circumstances surrounding a particular occurrence, our courts should
not lose sight of the fact that the rule is one of probabilities that
leaves the question of the defendant's negligence to the jury. The
mere fact that the rule is invoked is not an omen that the jury will
return a verdict for the plaintiff; -the invocation of the rule permits
an inference of negligence but it is not mandatory for the jury to find
negligence.
The rule of res ipsa loquitur is not to be applied to those cases
wherein evidence is abundant or plentiful. It is to be applied when
evidence is lacking; it is to be applied when the plaintiff, while being
28 PBossEp, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 43 (1941).
29 Ibid.
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free from contributory negligence, has been injured by an instrumen-
tality in the control of the defendant; it is to be applied when the
occurrence that causes the injury is unusual and unforeseen. When
these circumstances do not exist the rule does not apply. But when
they are present the rule of res ipsa loquitur is a rule to be applied
to enable the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case although he can-
not say wherein the defendant was negligent.30
WILLIAm A. CAHILL.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES-AGGRAVATION OF PREVIOUS INJURY,
DISEASE, DISABILITY OR LATENT WEAKNESS
1. Introduction
The law in some of its branches has been able to formulate
systems for measuring damages which operate in a more or less
mechanical manner. Such is the case, for example, in actions for
conversion, breach of contract, misrepresentation and trespass quare
clausum fregit. However, when the value of human life or its im-
pairment is involved, so many factors enter into the problem, that it
is quite impossible to develop any system which would be adaptable
to every case and treat each one justly. This is true especially of
certain tort actions, among them assault and battery, personal injuries
and death by wrongful act. In order to do justice in these cases
... such imponderable factors as degree of fault of defendant, fore-
seeability of results and proximity or remoteness existing between
defendant's act and the damages to plaintiff ... " must be consid-
ered, so that it is impossible that the law can work absolutely in this
field. Theoretically the measure of damages for personal injuries is
the money equivalent of the difference between the injured party's
physical condition before and after the injury. Practically, however,
many elements are involved. Plaintiff must be compensated, first,
for special expenses incurred, then for physical and mental suffering;
also for the value of time lost from work and for any lessening in
his future ability to work. Besides these factors, it is necessary to
30 Jesionowskd v. Boston & Maine R. R., 329 U. S. 452, 91 L. ed. 355
(1947); Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. R., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504
(1922) ; San Juan Light Co. v. Requena, 224 U. S. 89, 59 L. ed. 680 (1912).1 Bauer, Fundamental Principles of the Law of Damages hp Medico-Legal
Cases, 19 TEN's. L. REv. 255, 263 (1946).
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